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COMMENT 
THE FEDERAL POWER ACT’S DOUBLE 
STANDARD:  UNWINDING THE MOBILE-
SIERRA DOCTRINE AFTER MORGAN 
STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. PUBLIC 
UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 
JOHN M. WHITE* 
Emerging from two Supreme Court opinions decided in the 1950s, the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine has evolved to stand for a principle of contract sanctity in public 
utility rate setting.  The courts have largely come to the conclusion that the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has less authority to modify rates set 
by contract, as compared to unilaterally-filed tariff rates, when the contract is the result 
of arm’s-length negotiations between sophisticated parties of equal bargaining power, 
unless the contract indicates otherwise.  Only in “extraordinary circumstances,” the 
Court has found, may the Commission step in to modify any such “Mobile-Sierra 
contract.”   
This Comment argues that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, as interpreted recently in 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, departs 
from both the statutory intent of the Federal Power Act and the original cases from 
which the doctrine derived its name.  The Federal Power Act does not contemplate 
imposing any extraordinary barriers to Commission modification of contract rates.  
Similarly, the two cases from which the doctrine derived its name, United Gas Pipe 
Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. and Federal Power Commission v. 
Sierra Pacific Power Co., sought to protect the public interest by restraining a 
                                                          
 * Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 61; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2013, American University, Washington College of Law; B.S., Economics, 
2006, Pennsylvania State University.  Thank you to Meredith Goldich, my Note and 
Comment editor, and the Law Review staff for your significant effort in preparing this 
piece for publication.  I would also like to give a special thanks to my friends and 
family, especially my parents, for your endless support. 
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utility’s ability to unilaterally raise prices set in a contract, but they did not seek to 
limit the Commission’s authority to modify contracts generally.  By further limiting the 
Commission’s authority to modify contracts, Morgan Stanley has encroached on the 
Commission’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligation to protect the public interest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t doesn’t matter what you crazy people in California do, because I got 
smart guys out there who can always figure out how to make money.”1 
-Kenneth Lay, former CEO of Enron Corporation, speaking to 
David Freeman, then-Chairman of the California Power Authority 
 
On several occasions during 2000 and 2001, the lights went out in 
California, affecting businesses and everyday life and raising public 
ire.2  In Irvine, for example, computer-operated traffic lights went out 
in May 2001, turning freeways into parking lots and bringing much of 
                                                          
 1. Peter H. King et al., Paper Trail Points to Roots of Energy Crisis, L.A. TIMES, June 
16, 2002, at A1. 
 2. See John M. Broder, California Power Failures Linked to Energy Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A22 (explaining that the first blackouts in California since 
World War II caused thousands of businesses to close and interrupted power to 
homes, hospitals, schools, and shopping malls).  
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life there to a halt.3  A confluence of factors had caused rolling 
blackouts4 in the region,5 as prices for power rose to extraordinarily 
high levels at both wholesale and retail levels.6  Enron Corporation—
a major player in the newly-deregulated wholesale power markets and 
a behemoth once respected for its wealth and competence—
subsequently went into bankruptcy amid reports of scandal.7   
In the midst of this environment, and at the urging of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission),8 several utilities 
attempted to hedge the escalating prices in the wholesale electric 
power spot market by entering into contractual agreements with 
power sellers.9  Seeking relief from the rising prices, these utilities 
eventually agreed to buy power through long-term contracts at rates 
that dwarfed traditional levels, but were still considerably lower than 
the spot market prices during the crisis.10 
After the crisis passed and prices approached historical levels, three 
western utilities asked the Commission to modify the long-term 
power contracts they had entered into during the crisis.11  The 
utilities argued that the prices and terms in their contracts were 
unlawful as a result of the crisis conditions in western power markets 
                                                          
 3. James Sterngold, Blackout Plans of Little Help in California’s Energy Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2001, at A1. 
 4. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 FERC ¶ 61,121, at 61,353–55 (2000) 
(noting that Pacific Gas & Electric Company had to institute rolling blackouts in the 
San Francisco area on June 14, 2000, and summarizing a Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission Staff Report concluding that several factors contributed to the energy 
crisis, including increased demand due to high temperatures, insufficient generation 
resources, flawed regulatory policies, and the exercise of seller market power). 
 5. California belongs to a larger, regional electricity grid, so the problems in 
California extended beyond the borders of that state to others in the region.  Pub. 
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Cal. Power Exch. Corp., 245 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that retail customers of San Diego Gas & Electric company, for example, 
experienced rate increases of 200–300 percent); see also id. (explaining that, 
depending on whether a particular utility was still subject to a retail rate cap, utilities 
either passed the high wholesale rates on to retail customers or else were forced to 
assume tremendous debt themselves). 
 7. See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying 
Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A1 (detailing the rise and fall of Enron). 
 8. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 FERC ¶ 61,294, at 61,993 (2000) 
(encouraging utilities, in response to the crisis, to enter into contracts of two years or 
more). 
 9. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1068–72 (describing how the sudden 
spike in prices in the California spot market, an auction for day-ahead and day-of 
trading in wholesale electricity, led the various parties to seek alternative ways to 
secure their power needs).   
 10. See id. (explaining the bidding process that buyers encountered during the 
crisis when attempting to secure sufficient power through a long-term agreement). 
 11. See id. at 1069–72 (detailing the contractual arrangements, the three 
appellants, Snohomish, Southern Cal Water, and Nevada Power Companies, asked 
the Commission to modify). 
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at the time they executed their contracts.12  Relying on two cases from 
the 1950s, which together have formed what courts and other 
commentators refer to as the “Mobile-Sierra doctrine,” the Supreme 
Court held in Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District 
No. 113 that the Commission could relieve utilities of their contractual 
purchase obligations only after a finding of “unequivocal public 
necessity” or “extraordinary circumstances,” regardless of the type of 
contract at issue14 or the underlying market conditions.15  The Court 
concluded that the fact that the markets were chaotic when the 
parties entered into the agreements did not warrant undermining the 
“stabilizing force of contracts.”16 
This Comment will argue that the prevailing characterization of 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine articulated in Morgan Stanley contradicts the 
Federal Power Act (FPA) and misinterprets the relevant case law by 
creating a separate statutory review process for contract rates.  While 
contracts play an important role in setting rates in the energy 
industry, the Commission possesses a clear statutory responsibility to 
protect consumers, and this responsibility requires the flexibility to 
adjust contract rates to account for changing conditions in the 
markets and among consumers.  The intent of this Comment is not 
to necessarily argue the merits of the particular contract challenges 
involved in Morgan Stanley.  Rather, the purpose is to examine the 
prevailing interpretation of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine as articulated in 
Morgan Stanley and how that interpretation departs from the statutory 
intent and the case law.   
Part I of this Comment will explain the statutory background of 
federal power regulation, including the need for, and challenges of, 
regulation in this industry.  It will then discuss the development of 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and the factual background of Morgan 
Stanley.  Part II will argue that the Supreme Court erred in Morgan 
Stanley because its holding departs from the intent of the FPA.  The 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., Nev. Power Co., 99 FERC ¶ 61,047, at 61,185 (2002), order on reh’g, 
100 FERC ¶ 61,273, at 61,273 (2002) (seeking relief for certain contracts on the basis 
that prices charged based on a Commission-found dysfunctional market are per se 
unlawful).  
 13. 554 U.S. 527 (2008). 
 14. See id. at 528 (internal citations omitted) (holding that the Commission 
cannot modify a contract without meeting this high burden, even when a buyer 
challenges a contract rate that allegedly results in unreasonably high rates for 
consumers). 
 15. See id. at 547 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the 
Commission must determine whether the parties formed the contracts at issue under 
a dysfunctional market before applying the presumption of reasonableness required 
by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine). 
 16. Id. at 547–48. 
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FPA places no higher burden on the Commission’s authority to 
modify contract rates as compared to tariff rates, and the statute’s 
stated intent to protect the public interest requires the Commission 
to have the ability to modify contracts when necessary to fulfill that 
duty.  Part III will contend that Morgan Stanley misinterpreted the two 
Supreme Court decisions that created the Mobile-Sierra doctrine when 
concluding that these cases stood for an affirmation of contract 
sanctity.  This Comment will conclude by discussing how the unique 
characteristics of electricity require regulators to protect the public 
interest, an effort that Morgan Stanley hinders. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Federal Regulation of Electricity 
Electricity regulation developed according to what some scholars 
call the “utility consensus.”17  Under this philosophy, the duplication 
of running physical wires across the ground to allow for the 
competitive supply of energy would be redundant and inefficient.18  
As a result, policymakers allow for the formation of franchised 
monopolies and substitute regulation of these monopolies for direct 
competition.19  Several industries, including rail and 
telecommunications, have operated under similar regulatory 
schemes.20 
Electricity service generally involves three stages:  production (or 
generation) of power; long-distance transmission of power over high-
voltage lines; and local distribution of power over low-voltage lines to 
end-users.21  In the United States, predominantly private, investor-
                                                          
 17. See generally Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale:  Learning from the 
California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 476–82 (2002) (explaining the 
beginning of public utility regulation and questioning the accepted economic logic 
of regulating privately-owned natural monopolies as opposed to having full public 
ownership of electric utilities).  
 18. Id. at 476. 
 19. Id.; see also David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767–68 (2008) (noting that, in many parts of the world, state-
owned utilities have provided this service, but the United States has predominantly 
used a model that allows for publicly regulated, privately-owned utilities instead).  
But see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 811 (2d ed. 
2006) (arguing that, despite the assumption of the industry’s monopoly status, some 
competition has been present historically because electricity still competes with 
alternate energy sources such as oil and natural gas).  
 20. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 477 (2002) (discussing how 
telecommunications historically have been regulated as monopolistic public 
utilities); Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 64 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, provided the model for 
electricity regulation and interstate telephone service, among others). 
 21. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 748. 
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owned entities have traditionally had control over particular 
geographic service areas and have been vertically integrated, i.e., they 
have owned or operated all parts of the system.22  An investor-owned 
utility would therefore traditionally produce its own power, transmit 
the power over its own transmission and distribution systems, and 
then sell the power directly to retail customers.23  Under this model, 
regulators determine the proper rates for such service based on the 
“cost-of-service,” including both the cost of the company’s investment 
and a fair return on that investment.24   
Legislative and regulatory efforts, however, have led the industry to 
undergo substantial deregulatory reforms in the past few decades.25  
While both the transmission and local distribution of power possess 
the characteristics of a natural monopoly—building duplicate 
transmission and local distribution lines to allow for competition 
would clearly result in large-scale inefficiencies—the actual 
production of power does not have the same natural characteristics.26  
Thus, in recent decades, many independent generators and power 
marketers27 have entered the marketplace, and many of the large, 
vertically-integrated utilities28 have sold their generation resources.  
Such transactions promote competition in the production of 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 751.  But see id. at 756–59 (noting exceptions to the privately-owned 
model, including public power systems, rural electric cooperatives, federal power 
systems, power marketers, and independent power producers). 
 23. Id. at 809. 
 24. Id.  See generally id. at 78–79 (discussing the theory behind cost-of-service 
regulation). 
 25. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) 
(Supp. V 1981) (authorizing the Commission to, among other things, require 
utilities to purchase or sell electricity from non-traditional providers of power); 
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540–01 (May 10, 1996) (codified 
at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (hereinafter Order No. 888) (fostering competitive markets 
for wholesale power by requiring transmission owners to offer access to their 
transmission facilities on a non-discriminatory basis, thus preventing transmission 
owners from offering unduly preferential treatment to themselves and their 
affiliates); see also Spence, supra note 19, at 767–76 (describing the transition from 
publicly-regulated, vertically-integrated utilities to competition in the production of 
power). 
 26. See Spence, supra note 19, at 772 (describing how economists began to 
challenge the long-held view that the entire process of providing power was a natural 
monopoly with the realization that the production of power could be separated from 
the transmission and distribution functions). 
 27. Power marketers are market participants that do not own or operate any 
physical electric facilities; instead, they simply buy and re-sell power in the various 
markets.  BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 758. 
 28. Id. at 757.  Vertically-integrated utilities own all parts of electric service, from 
the generation of the power through the transmission and local distribution to the 
ultimate customers.  
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wholesale power.29  Further, the Commission has required investor-
owned utilities to provide non-discriminatory open access to their 
transmission facilities to foster competition in wholesale power 
markets.30  In many parts of the country, investor-owned utilities have 
voluntarily turned over functional operation of their transmission 
facilities to independent regional transmission operators.31  As such, 
the era in which nearly all generating resources were owned by 
vertically-integrated incumbent utilities controlling all three steps of 
the process (generation, transmission, and distribution) is largely 
over.32  
B. The Federal Power Act 
As technological advances enabled electricity to travel over longer 
distances, communities and businesses began to realize that they 
could procure power from resources in other states rather than 
relying exclusively on resources in their own state, which may have 
been farther away or more expensive.33  Due to the absence of a 
federal regulatory structure for the increasingly inter-state industry,34 
and a belief that the Interstate Commerce Act and other anti-trust 
statutes would not sufficiently protect consumers from the abuses of 
monopolists,35 Congress enacted Part II of the FPA in 1935.36  The 
                                                          
 29. See id. at 773 (describing how federal policies encouraging unbundling of 
wholesale power led many traditional utilities to sell or “spin off” their generating 
resources). 
 30. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540 (summarizing the Commission’s 
goal in the Final Rule as removing impediments to competition in wholesale power 
markets by requiring all transmission owners to file with the Commission an “Open 
Access Transmission Tariff,” which sets forth terms and conditions for non-
discriminatory transmission service). 
 31. See id. at 21,593–94 (encouraging, though not requiring, the formation of 
independent system operators as a means of achieving the Final Rule’s goal of having 
open, non-discriminatory access to transmission facilities).   
 32. See Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal 
Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 616–17 (2009) (noting that, while vertically-
integrated utilities owned 97 percent of generation in 1978, independent power 
producers have accounted for the majority of new resources since then).   
 33. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 743. 
 34. See id. at 747 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s determination that the 
Constitution limits states’ ability to regulate interstate sales of electricity contributed 
to the creation of a federal entity to regulate the sale for resale of electric energy in 
interstate commerce); see also Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam and 
Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927) (holding that regulation of rates charged for 
interstate service places a direct burden upon interstate commerce and therefore the 
Commerce Clause restrains the ability of states to regulate such business).  
 35. See Duane, supra note 17, at 477 (noting that the need to instantaneously 
produce power combined with the interconnectedness of the power grid allows for 
significant opportunity for the exercise of market power, including the ability to 
cause (or threaten to cause) blackouts by withholding power in times of shortage). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006).  While the Court’s decision in Mobile involved the 
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FPA authorizes the Commission37 to regulate the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce as well as the sale of such 
energy at the wholesale level by public utilities.38  In enacting this 
statute, Congress declared that the public interest is affected by the 
business of interstate transmission and the wholesale sale of energy, 
giving rise to the need for federal regulation.39  The statute requires 
the Commission to ensure that all rates within its jurisdiction are “just 
and reasonable” and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.40 
The “just and reasonable” statutory phrase did not originate in the 
FPA; statutes governing the regulation of public utilities and common 
carriers in a variety of industries have often used the same language.41  
While the text of the FPA provides little guidance on how to apply 
this broad standard,42 the Constitution does impose some 
limitations.43  For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments44 to the Constitution as barring 
“confiscatory rates” in the public utilities context.45  Under this 
                                                          
natural gas industry and the NGA, Morgan Stanley involved electricity contracts, and 
thus the Mobile-Sierra doctrine will be discussed herein as such.  Moreover, courts 
generally cite decisions interpreting the relevant provisions of the FPA and the NGA 
interchangeably because, in most respects, they are substantially identical.  Ark. La. 
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981).   
 37. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (FWPA) created the Federal Power 
Commission to oversee the construction of hydroelectric dams.  16 U.S.C. § 792 
(1925 & Supp. VII 1933).  The 1935 statute combined with the FWPA to create a new 
statute, called the Federal Power Act.  BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 747 n.1.  
Congress later changed the name of the Federal Power Commission to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.  Id.        
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).  The term “wholesale” means the sale of electric energy 
for resale.  Id. § 824(d).  States, not the federal government, regulate retail rates, or 
the rates charged directly to the public.  Id. § 824(b)(1).  In this way, then, the FPA 
protects consumers indirectly:  the FPA seeks to ensure that purchasers of wholesale 
power purchase power at just and reasonable rates so that when those purchasers 
pass on their costs to retail customers, the costs are not excessive. 
 39. Id. § 824(a). 
 40. Id. § 824a-3(b)(1)–(2). 
 41. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1934) (“All 
charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with 
[interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio], shall be just and reasonable . 
. . .”); see also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 477 (2002) (referring to 
the “just and reasonable” standard as a “familiar mandate” in the context of public 
utility regulation). 
 42. See Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham, The Requirements of the 
“Just and Reasonable Standard”:  Legal Bases for Reform of Electric Transmission Rates, 21 
ENERGY L.J. 389, 410 (2000) (stating that neither the statute nor its legislative history 
provide much explanation of how to apply this standard). 
 43. See generally id. at 397–410 (discussing the Constitution’s implications on the 
just and reasonable standard). 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments address property interests with respect to the federal 
government and state governments, respectively. 
 45. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 
679, 690 (1923) (holding that the validity of the West Virginia Public Service 
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reasoning, a rate low enough to be labeled “confiscatory,” i.e., a rate 
that would prevent the utility from staying in business, would violate 
the Constitution’s prohibition on taking private property for public 
use without just compensation or due process of law.46  Due to the 
complexity of rate regulation, however, statutory reasonableness 
requires only that rates fall within a so-called “zone of 
reasonableness” rather than at a particular point.47  This zone is 
“bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and 
at the other by the consumer interest against exorbitant rates.”48  The 
Commission retains broad authority to exercise its discretion in 
setting rates within this zone.49 
Two provisions of the FPA, sections 20550 and 206,51 govern the 
Commission’s obligation to regulate rates for the transmission and 
wholesale sale of electric energy in interstate commerce.52  Pursuant 
to section 205, all public utilities53 must file with the Commission 
compilations of their rate schedules setting forth the prices and terms 
                                                          
Commission’s order prescribing rates turned on whether the rates would yield a 
sufficient return for rendering service, as failing to do so would deprive the utility of 
its property under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 46. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . 
.”).   
 47. See Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) 
(characterizing statutory reasonableness as an “abstract quality” that allows for a 
substantial range between what is unreasonably low and what is unreasonably high); 
see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 277–79 (1976) (rejecting 
the Commission’s contention that attempting to remedy a discriminatory rate by 
lowering it would always result in an unjustly low rate by noting that there is a “zone 
of reasonableness” rather than a single reasonable rate).    
 48. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1176–77 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (citing Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950)). 
 49. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) 
(holding that the statute does not bind the Commission to any specific formula for 
setting rates and that the effect of the final rate, not the methods employed, 
determines the lawfulness).  
 50. 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006). 
 51. Id. § 824e. 
 52. The NGA contains analogous provisions governing the setting of rates for the 
sale and transmission of natural gas in interstate commerce.  Compare id. § 824d (“All 
rates . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . .”), and id. § 824e (“Whenever the 
Commission . . . shall find that any rate, . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and 
reasonable rate, . . . to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by 
order.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2006) (“All rates . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . 
.”), and id. § 717d (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall find that any rate, . . . is 
unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall 
determine the just and reasonable rate . . . to be thereafter observed and in force, 
and shall fix the same by order.”).   
 53. The FPA defines “public utility” as any entity that “owns or operates facilities 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . .”  Id. § 824e.   
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of service.54  These rate schedules typically come in the form of 
“tariffs,” which are essentially offers to serve at the particular rates 
and terms specified therein.55  The utility may unilaterally propose 
changes to its tariffs under section 205 at any time, provided that it 
gives sixty days prior notice to the public before the proposed 
changes go into effect.56  Interested parties may comment on the 
proposed changes, and the Commission may investigate whether the 
proposed rate is just and reasonable.57  The utility bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the proposed rate or charge meets the statutory 
just and reasonable standard, but the utility need not show that its 
proposed rate is more just and reasonable than other possible rates or 
that the rate or charge already on file is unjust and unreasonable.58 
Aside from the express authority under section 205 to reject a 
utility’s proposed change to a rate on file if the utility fails to 
demonstrate its reasonableness, the Commission has the authority 
under section 206 to modify an existing rate.59  As a precondition to 
making such a change pursuant to section 206, however, the 
Commission first must find, in response to a complaint or upon its 
own motion, that the existing rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory or preferential and that the proposed rate is just and 
reasonable.60  Changing an existing rate under section 206 therefore 
requires a different showing than accepting a proposal as just and 
reasonable under section 205. 
Importantly, in addition to the utility setting rates by unilateral 
tariff filing, which sets forth the rates and terms of service available to 
any purchaser that wishes to do business with the utility, section 205 
contemplates a role for privately-negotiated bilateral contracts.61  
Utilities can therefore negotiate and enter into contractual 
agreements for rates and terms of service with individual purchasers, 
and, like tariffs, the utility must file such contracts with the 
                                                          
 54. Id. § 824d(c).  
 55. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 531 
(2008). 
 56. See Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(summarizing the statutory procedure for setting rates). 
 57. See § 824d(e) (stating that the Commission may hold a hearing to determine 
the lawfulness of the rate and may suspend the rate for up to five months). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See § 824e(a) (allowing the Commission to determine the “just and 
reasonable” rate upon finding that a rate is unreasonable). 
 60. Id.; see also Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating 
that the Commission or the complaining customer bears the burden of proof under 
section 206 to show that the existing rate is in fact unlawful). 
 61. See § 824d(c) (“[E]very public utility shall file with the Commission . . . all 
rates . . . together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates 
. . . .”). 
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Commission.62  In this respect, the FPA differs notably from other 
federal rate-regulation statutes.63  Indeed, courts have generally 
disfavored rates set by contract because such rates often lead to 
treating similarly-situated customers differently.64  When Congress 
included in the FPA the allowance for contract rates, it implicitly 
acknowledged that negotiated contracts could serve as a useful means 
of allocating risk in the sale for resale and transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce, in contrast to rates for other utilities 
or common carriers.65  Nevertheless, the FPA on its face does not 
distinguish between contract and tariff rates with respect to the 
requirement that all rates must be just and reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential.66   
As the power markets have become more competition-oriented and 
less regulated, market-based rates have emerged as an alternative to 
traditional cost-of-service regulation.67  With market-based rates, 
rather than setting rate schedules based on the cost of providing 
service, a seller can file a tariff that essentially states that the seller will 
enter into freely-negotiated contracts with purchasers.68  This 
procedure largely eliminates the need to file individual contracts with 
the Commission for review and approval before they go into effect.69  
Before receiving market-based rate authority, however, the utility 
                                                          
 62. Id. 
 63. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 478 (2002) (noting that the 
traditional regulatory scheme for rates at the federal level called for a purely tariff-
based system in which the utility filed the rate schedule, parties had the right to 
comment, and then the regulatory authority accepted the rate if it was just and 
reasonable).  
 64. See Boston Edison, 233 F.3d at 64 (describing how the individualized nature of 
contracts, as opposed to one-size-fits-all tariffs, inevitably results in different rates for 
similar service, a result that, by definition, is discriminatory); cf. Interstate Commerce 
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10741(2) (2000) (prohibiting a rail carrier from charging a 
compensation for its service different than it would charge another person for 
performing a “like and contemporaneous service”). 
 65. See Boston Edison, 233 F.3d at 64–65 (differentiating electric utilities from 
other utilities by noting that electric utilities tend to be large companies for which 
negotiated contracts form a useful means of allocating risk).  The NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 
717, similarly allows for rates set by contract.  See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile 
Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338–39 (1956) (explaining that the sheer number of 
railroad transactions required compliance with a single schedule of rates applicable 
to all, while a much smaller number of wholesale transactions regulated by the 
Natural Gas Act allowed for individualized arrangements between producers and 
distributors). 
 66. § 824d(a).  
 67. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
535–37 (2008) (describing how technological change led the Commission to permit 
sellers of wholesale power to operate pursuant to market-based tariffs). 
 68. Id. at 537. 
 69. See id. (noting that the Commission does not subject rates entered into under 
market-based tariffs to the requirement of immediate filing). 
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must demonstrate a lack of market power70 in generation and 
transmission (or sufficient mitigation thereof), and the utility must 
thereafter file quarterly reports with the Commission containing 
Commission-specified contract information.71  Courts have upheld 
the market-based rate regulatory option, holding that it does not 
conflict with the FPA’s requirement that the Commission ensure the 
lawfulness of all rates.72  Despite this change in how many utilities set 
rates, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine remains equally as applicable in the 
market-based rate context.73   
C. Origin of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine 
The Supreme Court issued two opinions in 1956 during the era of 
traditional cost-of-service regulation, which created what the courts 
and the Commission have come to call the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.74  
With the FPA and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), the analogous statute 
governing the Commission’s regulation of the natural gas industry, 
allowing private contractual arrangements to play a role in rate-
setting, these twin decisions grappled with the inherent conflict 
between maintaining the integrity of private contractual agreements 
and the need to regulate a public good.75  Over the years, courts have 
come to interpret these two cases as erring on the side of contract 
stability and constraining the Commission’s regulatory authority to 
modify contracts when such contracts are the product of arm’s-
length, bilateral negotiations between sophisticated parties of equal 
bargaining power.76  According to this interpretation of the doctrine, 
                                                          
 70. Possessing “market power” means that an entity has the ability to set prices 
above a competitive level.  BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 155. 
 71. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 72. See id. at 1011–13  (holding on appeal that the preliminary demonstration of 
a lack of market power combined with the Commission’s reporting requirements 
suffice to comply with the statutory scheme). 
 73. See David G. Tewksbury & Stephanie S. Lim, Applying the Mobile-Sierra 
Doctrine to Market-Based Rate Contracts, 26 ENERGY L.J. 437, 439 (2005) (concluding 
that the distinctions between cost-based and market-based contracts are largely 
meaningless in the Mobile-Sierra context). 
 74. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956); 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).  
 75. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344 (explaining that the NGA affords a “reasonable 
accommodation” between contract stability and public regulation by limiting the 
unilateral modification of contracts while maintaining the Commission’s authority to 
oversee contract rates); see also Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 
2000) (contending that the Mobile and Sierra decisions attempted to mesh a newly-
forming respect for contracts in public utility regulation with the traditional, tariff-
based scheme of utility regulation); Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 689 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (stating that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine represents the Court’s attempt to 
balance private contractual rights and the Commission’s regulatory authority). 
 76. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 699 
(2010) (defining the Mobile-Sierra doctrine as a presumption that contract rates freely 
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rates set by contract, as opposed to by tariff, carry a heavy 
presumption of reasonableness, and the Commission has to 
overcome a more demanding standard of review to modify any such 
contract.77  The reasoning underlying this standard is that the parties 
to such a contractual agreement presumably possess equal bargaining 
power and can be expected to negotiate a just and reasonable rate 
between them.78  Parties can “contract out” of the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine,79 but it remains the default rule if the contract is silent as to 
the review standard that will apply.80 
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.,81 Mobile Gas 
Service Corporation (Mobile), a natural gas distributor, entered into 
a ten-year deal with a cement company in which Mobile would 
furnish gas at 12 cents per thousand cubic feet to the cement 
company.82  To fulfill its obligation to supply gas to the cement 
company, Mobile also entered into a ten-year contract with United 
Gas Pipe Line Company (United) in which it would purchase gas 
from United at the equivalent of 10.7 cents per thousand cubic feet.83  
By contracting to buy gas at a relatively low price and to sell it at a 
higher price, Mobile stood to profit from these two arrangements.   
Several years before the end of the term of the contract with 
Mobile, however, United unilaterally filed rate schedules (tariffs) with 
the Commission that would have increased the price Mobile paid for 
gas to 14.5 cents per thousand cubic feet, thus modifying the existing 
contract.84  Mobile petitioned the Commission to reject United’s 
filing, arguing that United could not unilaterally alter the contract, 
but the Commission declined, holding that the new rate became 
effective unless the Commission found the new rate to be unlawful, 
                                                          
negotiated between sophisticated parties meet the just and reasonable standard). 
 77. Id.  
 78. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 (2002) (differentiating 
the way the government regulates business-to-business rates from how the 
government regulates rates charged by businesses to the public). 
 79. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 
103, 109–13 (1958) (clarifying that a pipeline company could file unilaterally to 
increase a contract rate when the contract itself states that the customers would pay 
the pipeline’s “going rate” for service); see also Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 
F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing a “middle ground” between Memphis Light 
and Mobile-Sierra in which parties agree that the utility cannot unilaterally file a rate 
to supersede a contract rate but that the Commission can set aside the rate if it 
results in an unfair return, not just if it violates the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
standard).   
 80. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 537 
(2008). 
 81. 350 U.S. 332 (1956). 
 82. Id. at 336. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 336.  
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which it did not.85   
The Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Commission’s 
finding, holding that the NGA did not replace the law of private 
contracts; rather, the Act intended to incorporate the private law of 
contracts into the regulatory scheme.86  The Court thus held that a 
utility could not violate well-known contract principles by changing a 
rate contract unilaterally through a tariff filing.87  Such a holding 
promoted the intent of the statute, the Court reasoned, because 
although it preserved the integrity of contracts by precluding 
unilateral modification by one party to the contract, it still 
maintained the Commission’s “paramount authority” to modify rates 
when necessary in the public interest.88   
Although the Court did not define the “public interest” in Mobile, it 
went on to do so in the companion opinion Federal Power Commission 
v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.89  Sierra involved similar facts to Mobile.90  In 
Sierra, Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra) was an electricity 
distributor that had historically purchased most of its power from 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a public utility.91  Seeing 
an increase in demand for power after the end of World War II, 
Sierra began to negotiate with other suppliers.92  Concerned about 
losing its customer, PG&E offered, and Sierra accepted, a fifteen-year 
purchase agreement for power at a special low rate.93  The parties 
then filed the contract with the Commission.94  About halfway 
through the term of the contract, PG&E unilaterally filed with the 
Commission under section 205 of the FPA a tariff that purported to 
increase its contract rate with Sierra by approximately 28 percent.95   
As in the Mobile/United proceeding, the Commission initiated a 
hearing pursuant to section 205 to determine the new rate’s 
reasonableness.96  The Commission ultimately accepted the new rate, 
finding that it was not unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 336–37. 
 86. See id. at 338–39 (noting that the NGA evinced no clear intent to abrogate 
contract rates and that the express role for contracts in the statute, in contrast to the 
Interstate Commerce Act, suggests that Congress indeed contemplated a role for 
private contracts in setting rates). 
 87. Id. at 337. 
 88. Id. at 344. 
 89. 350 U.S. 348 (1956).   
 90. Sierra involved contracts related to the sale of electric power while Mobile 
involved the sale of natural gas. 
 91. Id. at 351. 
 92. Id. at 351–52. 
 93. Id. at 352. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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preferential.97  On appeal, mirroring its holding in Mobile,98 the 
Supreme Court ultimately held that PG&E’s unilateral filing under 
section 205 could not supersede the contract rate simply on a 
Commission finding that the new rate was just and reasonable.99  
Either the Commission or the party seeking a rate change would have 
to first make a showing that the rate on file was unjust and 
unreasonable.100   
The Court in Sierra then went a step further.  Although the 
Commission found the contract rate unjust and unreasonable in its 
order, the Court held that it did so by applying an erroneous 
standard.101  The Commission had found the contract rate 
unreasonable solely because it resulted in a less than fair return on 
PG&E’s net invested capital.102  The Court concluded that:   
[W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose 
upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair 
return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree 
by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it 
does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain.103   
The Court continued by noting that, in such circumstances—where 
the seller’s contract proves less profitable than desired—the 
Commission’s sole concern should be whether the rate is so low as to 
adversely affect the public interest.104  Putting this idea of affecting 
the “public interest” into context, a phrase taken directly from the 
FPA,105 the Court explained that circumstances affecting the public 
interest could include instances when the low rate would impair the 
financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon 
other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.106  
The Court reasoned that, because the Commission’s authority under 
                                                          
 97. Id.; see In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 13 F.P.C. 200, 203–10 (1954), set aside by 
Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 223 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (finding 
that the proposed rate change provided a reasonable return on PG&E’s net 
investment and was consistent with the only other rate schedule PG&E had on file 
with the Commission).  
 98. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353 (holding that the Court’s interpretation of the NGA in 
Mobile applied to the analogous provisions of the FPA). 
 99. Id.  
 100. See id. (noting that the condition precedent to the Commission exercising its 
section 206 authority to modify rates is a finding that the existing rate is not just and 
reasonable). 
 101. Id. at 354. 
 102. Id. at 354–55. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 372.  
 105. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006) (declaring that the “business of transmitting 
and selling electric energy . . . is affected with a public interest . . . .”) (emphasis 
added).  
 106. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355.  
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section 206 to modify rates is premised on its obligation to protect 
the public interest, the Commission cannot find a contract unjust or 
unreasonable simply because the contract proves unprofitable to the 
utility.107 
In the ensuing years after Mobile and Sierra, the Supreme Court had 
little to say about the implication of these decisions, leaving the 
matter largely in the hands of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.108  The 
courts struggled to interpret this rule, particularly in contexts that 
differed from Mobile and Sierra, which both involved a seller asking 
the Commission to increase rates set by contracts that were already 
on file with the Commission.109   
The Commission110 and the U.S. Courts of Appeals111 soon began 
referring to two different standards of review for rates:  the ordinary 
just and reasonable standard for tariff rates, and a stricter, more 
deferential, Mobile-Sierra “public interest standard” for contract 
rates.112  The prevailing characterization of Mobile and Sierra therefore 
became that those decisions placed significant restrictions on the 
Commission’s ability to modify contract rates that did not explicitly 
reserve the Commission’s ordinary just and reasonable standard of 
review.113  Indeed, some have characterized the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
as erecting a “practically insurmountable” barrier to contract 
modification.114 
                                                          
 107. Id. 
 108. See John E. McCaffrey, Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility 
District No. 1 Revisits the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine:  Some Answers, More Questions, 30 
ENERGY L.J. 53, 57 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court only issued a handful 
of opinions discussing the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and provided limited guidance on 
how to apply the doctrine in varying contexts). 
 109. See generally Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra Rule:  Its Illustrious Past and 
Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353, 358–63 (2000) (detailing the “middle age[s]” of 
the doctrine and explaining that courts have interpreted and applied the rule 
differently depending on the particular context of the case). 
 110. See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 39 FERC ¶ 63,026, at 
65,141 (1987) (stating that two of the parties relied “upon the ‘just and reasonable’ 
standard, rather than upon the stricter ‘public interest’ standard set forth in the 
[Mobile-Sierra] cases . . . .”). 
 111. See, e.g., Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The 
public interest standard of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is much more restrictive than 
the just and reasonable standard . . . .”). 
 112. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
535 (2008) (noting the Commission’s tendency to refer to two modes of review, one 
with the Mobile-Sierra “public interest standard” and the other without this 
presumption, i.e. the ordinary just and reasonable standard).  
 113. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 50 FERC ¶ 61,266, order on remand, 66 FERC ¶ 
61,332, at 62,085 (1994) (“We recognize, moreover, that the resulting Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine consistently has been construed, by the Commission as well as by the courts, 
as placing substantial restrictions on the Commission’s authority to modify previously 
accepted fixed-rate contracts.”). 
 114. Papago Tribal Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  But see Ne. 
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D. Morgan Stanley v. Public Utility District No. 1:  Revisiting the 
Mobile-Sierra Doctrine   
In 2008, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision 
on the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in Morgan Stanley.115  In the wake of the 
western energy crisis of 2000-2001,116 the Court provided its most 
detailed explanation of the breadth and intricacies of the doctrine 
since the namesake cases in 1956.117 
In the 1990s, Californians paid more for electricity than customers 
in neighboring states.118  Amid pressure to reduce rates, the state 
began to experiment with the idea of adopting “retail competition,” 
which, in effect, would allow end-use customers to choose their 
electricity supplier rather than having to receive service from the 
vertically-integrated incumbent utility—the theory being that 
competition would drive down retail prices.119  In 1996, the California 
legislature passed Assembly Bill 1890, a major piece of legislation 
designed to facilitate the transition to retail competition.120  Among 
other things, this legislation created the California Power 
Exchange,121 a non-profit entity responsible for facilitating a day-
ahead and day-of auction process for the sale and purchase of 
wholesale power, known as the “spot market.”122  The California 
Power Exchange was considered a public utility under the FPA and 
was thus subject to the Commission’s regulatory jurisdiction.123  
Assembly Bill 1890 also created the California Independent System 
Operator, a non-profit entity responsible for operating the 
transmission facilities of the investor-owned utilities and 
administering the “real-time” power market.124  The new law required 
investor-owned utilities to sell off a substantial portion of their 
                                                          
Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 690 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting Papago’s 
characterization of the public interest standard of review as “practically 
insurmountable” in all circumstances and noting that “[i]t all depends on whose ox 
is gored and how the public interest is affected”). 
 115. 554 U.S. 527 (2008). 
 116. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 540–41  
 117. See McCaffrey, supra note 108, at 53 (outlining several of the issues related to 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine that the Court clarified in Morgan Stanley).  
 118. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 964. 
 119. Id.  Under a competitive retail competition scheme, the incumbent utility 
provider continues to distribute power to retail customers and remains a regulated 
natural monopoly, but customers have the opportunity to choose the entity that 
actually produces the electricity.  See generally id. at 906–12 (providing background on 
the goals states seek to achieve by implementing a system of retail competition). 
 120. Act of Sept. 23, 1996, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 854 (A.B. 1890) (West).  
 121. Id. § 1(c). 
 122. In re Cal. Power Exch. Corp., 245 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 123. Id. 
 124. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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generation assets, to sell the output of their remaining resources into 
the newly-created spot market, and to purchase most of their power 
from the spot market.125 
In the summer of 2000, wholesale power prices spiked 
dramatically.126  On June 28, 2000, the spot market’s constrained day-
ahead price peaked at $1,099 per megawatt/hour, an increase fifteen 
times higher than the average cost before the industry 
restructuring.127  The Commission issued an order in the fall of 2000 
explaining its view that three primary factors caused the spike in 
prices:  (1) competitive market forces (i.e., increased power 
production costs combined with increased demand due to unusually 
high temperatures and a scarcity of available generation);128 (2) an 
over-reliance on the spot markets;129 and (3) the possible exercise of 
market power.130 
To help address the dysfunctional wholesale markets, the 
Commission urged sellers to enter into long-term contracts rather 
than relying primarily on volatile spot markets for their energy 
needs.131  After the crisis passed, some of the entities that had 
followed the Commission’s advice filed complaints under section 206 
of the FPA, asking the Commission to lower their contract rates.132  
Those requests, and the subsequent denials by the Commission, 
motivated this case.133  
Morgan Stanley involved petitions for review of Commission orders 
denying modification of three separate sets of wholesale power 
contracts entered into during the California energy crisis.134  All three 
sets of contracts involved rates that were very high by historical 
standards, which the petitioners asked the Commission to modify 
after prices returned closer to normal levels.135  After a hearing, the 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 1008–09. 
 126. Id. at 1009. 
 127. In re Cal., 245 F.3d at 1115 n.2. 
 128. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. Power Exch., 93 FERC ¶ 61,121, at 61,354–
55 (2000). 
 129. Id. ¶ 61,359. 
 130. Id. ¶ 61,376. 
 131. See id. ¶ 61,348 (eliminating the requirement that utilities satisfy all of their 
energy needs in the spot market and urging that spot market purchases should 
merely supplement a utility’s portfolio rather than define it).    
 132. See Nev. Power Co. v. Enron Power Mktg., Inc., 101 FERC ¶ 63,031, at 65,270 
n.2 (2002) (listing the several complainants and respondents whose disputes gave 
rise to the Morgan Stanley decision).  
 133. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 541–
42 (2008). 
 134. Nev. Power Co., 101 FERC at 65,270, order on partial initial decision, 103 FERC ¶ 
61,354, at 62,409–10 (2003), order on reh’g, 105 FERC ¶ 61,182, at 61,939 (2003).  
 135. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 541. 
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Administrative Law Judge’s Initial Decision concluded that the Mobile-
Sierra “public interest” standard was the applicable standard of review 
and denied the petitioners’ complaints under that standard.136  The 
Commission then issued an order on the Initial Decision, finding, 
among other things, that applying the three factors articulated in 
Sierra, and considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
complainants failed to meet the “public interest” standard for 
modifying the contracts.137 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that, to be consistent with the original Mobile and Sierra 
decisions, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies only where the 
Commission has had an initial opportunity to review the contract 
without any presumption of reasonableness.138  The Ninth Circuit also 
held that a different standard for overcoming the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness applies when a purchaser, 
rather than a seller, challenges the contract.139  The Ninth Circuit 
thus remanded the case to the Commission so that it could apply the 
proper standard for reviewing challenges to these contracts.140 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
on several important points but nevertheless affirmed its decision on 
alternative grounds.141  The Court held that the Commission must 
presume that a rate set out in any freely-negotiated wholesale energy 
contract meets the just and reasonable standard of the FPA (unless 
the contract specifies otherwise) and that this presumption may be 
overcome only if the Commission concludes that the contract 
seriously harms the public interest.142  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
held that the FPA intended to reserve the Commission’s power to 
                                                          
 136. Nev. Power Co., 101 FERC at 65,277–78.  
 137. See Order on Partial Initial Decision, 103 FERC at 62,410 (“We find that the 
challenged contracts are not contrary to the public interest because the 
Complainants have failed to demonstrate that the contracts in question caused 
[them] financial distress . . . cast an excessive burden on customers . . . were unduly 
discriminatory to the detriment of other customers . . . or that any other factors on 
this record demonstrate that the contracts are contrary to the public interest.”). 
 138. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006), 
vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (“To justify the Mobile-Sierra mode of review, 
the regulatory scheme in which the contracts are formed must provide FERC with an 
opportunity for initial review of the contracted rate.”). 
 139. See id. at 1087 (arguing that the Commission relied on the wrong legal 
standard when determining the impact of the rates on the public interest because it 
applied the factors from a low-rate challenge—which would be used if a seller were 
bringing suit—rather than the factors for a high-rate challenge—which would be 
used if purchasers of energy were bringing suit, as in the case here).   
 140. Id. at 1090.  
 141. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 528 
(2008).  
 142. Id. at 527. 
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modify contracts to “extraordinary circumstances” where the public 
will be “severely harmed.”143  While acknowledging that the statutory 
just and reasonable standard must apply to all rates, the Court 
concluded that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine requires a differing 
application of the just and reasonable standard for rates set by 
contract.144   
Additionally, the Court held that:  (1) the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption of reasonableness applies even when the Commission 
has not had an initial opportunity to review the contract rate;145 and 
(2) the standard to reform a contract does not differ based on 
whether the seller, rather than the buyer, challenges the rate; in 
either case, “only when the mutually agreed-upon contract rate 
seriously harms the consuming public may the Commission declare it 
not to be just and reasonable.”146  Thus, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Ninth Circuit’s holdings on these two points, but still affirmed its 
decision to remand the case to the Commission.147  This decision 
answered some lingering questions about how the Commission 
should apply the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in circumstances differing 
from those in Mobile and Sierra148 and held that the Mobile-Sierra public 
interest standard remains the default rule for all contract rates.149  
                                                          
 143. Id. at 551. 
 144. Id. at 535. 
 145. See id. at 545 (arguing that requiring an initial opportunity for Commission 
review before applying any Mobile-Sierra presumption would be contrary to the statute 
and would violate the “commonsense notion” in Sierra that parties to a contract can 
negotiate a just and reasonable rate between themselves). 
 146. Id. at 545–46, 548 (“The standard for a buyer’s challenge must be the same, 
generally speaking, as the standard for a seller’s challenge . . . .”).  
 147. Id. at 555. 
 148. See generally McCaffrey, supra note 108, at 73–74 (discussing the lingering 
Mobile-Sierra issues that Morgan Stanley sought to clarify). 
 149. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 534.  Prior to Morgan Stanley, courts viewed the 
doctrine as evolving to allow great freedom of contract including allowing parties to 
specify in a contract that a subsequent rate will replace the contract rate, or 
alternatively, to specify that while a subsequent rate cannot supercede a contract rate, 
the Commission can review the contract rate to determine whether it generates an 
unfair rate of return.  Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 
1983).)  After Morgan Stanley, however, the Mobile-Sierra presumption clearly remains 
the “default rule.”  Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 534; see also Standard of Review for 
Modifications of Jurisdictional Agreements, 73 Fed. Reg. 79420, 79421 (Dec. 29, 
2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (withdrawing a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking which sought to clarify the standard of review for modifications to 
contracts that did not specify which standard to use because of Morgan Stanley’s 
holding that the Mobile-Sierra presumption remains the default rule). 
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II. THE MORGAN STANLEY DECISION CONTRADICTS THE 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF THE FPA TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM 
EXCESSIVE RATES 
The Supreme Court erred in Morgan Stanley by holding that the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine requires the Commission to apply, as a default, 
a more deferential application of the statutory just and reasonable 
review for contract rates.150  The FPA’s just and reasonable standard 
does not distinguish between contract and tariff rates and does not 
contemplate imposing barriers to Commission review of certain 
Commission-jurisdictional rates.151   
By holding that the Commission may modify a rate set forth in a 
Mobile-Sierra contract only in extraordinary circumstances,152 the 
Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley contradicts a plain reading of the 
FPA and Congress’s clear intent to protect consumers from excessive 
rates.153  The statute’s mandate to protect the “public interest” 
requires the Commission to distinguish between the interests of the 
consuming public and the interests of utilities when conducting its 
just and reasonable review.154  Morgan Stanley hinders the 
Commission’s ability to make this distinction.155 
                                                          
 150. See id. at 535 (explaining that the just and reasonable standard is the only 
standard applicable for reviewing rates under Mobile-Sierra, and that the “public 
interest” standard simply refers to the fact that the application of the just and 
reasonable standard can be different when applied to contract rates).   
 151. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), 824d(c), 824e(a) (2006); see Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 
556 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that sections 205 and 206 distinguish between 
the rate-setting roles of utilities and the Commission, but not between rates set by 
tariffs versus contracts). 
 152. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 (holding that the FPA “reserve[s] the 
Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those extraordinary circumstances 
where the public will be severely harmed”). 
 153. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (emphasis added) (“Whenever the Commission . . .  shall 
find that any rate, charge, or classification . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and 
reasonable rate . . . and shall fix the same by order.”); id. (stating that federal 
regulation of this industry is necessary to protect the public interest); Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974) (emphasis added) (highlighting 
that the statute declares unlawful all rates that are not just and reasonable and does 
not permit a “little unlawfulness”). 
 154. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) 
(stating that the Commission has section 206 authority to modify rates for the 
purpose of protecting the public interest, not the private interests of utilities); see also 
Jeffrey McIntyre Gray, Reconciling Market-Based Rates with the Just and Reasonable 
Standard, 26 ENERGY L.J. 423, 427 (2005) (characterizing the FPA as a consumer-
protection statute). 
 155. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548 (holding that the Commission should 
generally not make a distinction between a seller’s challenge and a buyer’s 
challenge).  Because wholesale transactions often involve two parties that, in their 
ordinary course of business, act as both sellers and buyers of power, distinguishing 
between a “seller” and a “buyer” in any given transaction may involve an 
oversimplification.  Id.  Nevertheless, the Court appears to reject the idea that the 
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First, the statute does not differentiate between the various ways 
that regulated entities set rates, i.e., by contract or by tariff, and it 
states that any rate deemed unjust and unreasonable is unlawful and 
must be set aside.156  In particular, the FPA provides that “all rates and 
charges . . . shall be just and reasonable”157 and that the Commission 
shall determine the lawful rate “whenever” it finds an existing rate to 
be unjust and unreasonable.158  The two FPA provisions governing the 
setting of rates for wholesale power, sections 205 and 206, do not 
distinguish between contract and tariff rates and do not define or 
explain any heightened burden the Commission must overcome 
depending on how a utility sets the rate.159  The provisions refer only 
in general terms to “rates,” “charges,” and “rate schedules” and do 
not separate rates set by contract and those set by tariff into separate 
subsections of the statute.160   
Second, the Morgan Stanley Court’s interpretation of the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine contradicts Congress’s intent that the FPA protect the 
public interest,161 which requires the Commission to distinguish 
between the interests of the consuming public and the interests of 
utilities when conducting its just and reasonable review.162  This 
limiting of the Commission’s ability to modify excessively high 
contract rates infringes on the Commission’s duty to protect the 
public interest.163  For example, this holding may saddle customers 
with excessive rates that the Commission would find unlawful under 
                                                          
Commission should consider whether the interest of the contract challenge aligns 
with the public interest as opposed to purely private interests.  Id. 
 156. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (treating all “rates” equally under the statute). 
 157. Id. § 824d(a) (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. § 824e(a); cf. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 783–84 
(1968) (construing the analogous provisions of the Natural Gas Act as permitting the 
Commission, without qualification or exception, to change any rate it finds to 
unlawfully “contravene the relevant public interest[]”).   
 159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 
U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (explaining that the impact of a rate, not any underlying 
methods used to determine the rate, matters when the Commission reviews the rate’s 
lawfulness).   
 160. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e.  
 161. Id. § 824d(a) (“It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling 
electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public 
interest, and that Federal regulation of . . . the sale of such energy . . . is necessary in 
the public interest . . . .”). 
 162. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) 
(clarifying that the Commission’s section 206 authority exists to protect the public 
interest as distinguished from private profit-making interests of utilities).   
 163. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 702 
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that, absent a demonstration that the 
contracts in question “seriously harm” the public interest, consumers will end up 
paying higher rates than would be otherwise considered reasonable). 
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ordinary circumstances.164 
While the statute does not elaborate on what precisely constitutes 
the “public interest,” the Court has historically defined it, and the 
broader intent of the statute, as keeping rates as low as reasonably 
possible consistent with the maintenance of an adequate level of 
service.165  In fact, Congress intended to afford the public a 
“complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from 
excessive rates and charges,”166 and the Commission cannot ignore 
even a “small dent in the consumer’s pocket” when performing its 
just and reasonable review.167 
Given the regulated utility model in this country, one that prefers 
regulation of natural monopolies over direct public ownership of 
utilities,168 the Commission must balance the interests of both 
consumers and investors when performing its just and reasonable 
review.169  To protect the public from excessive rates while also 
ensuring that consumers have reliable access to this essential 
“product,” the Commission both protects against the monopolist’s 
tendency to exploit its economic position while also ensuring, under 
its traditional regulatory model, that the regulated entity has the 
opportunity to recover its costs and a reasonable return.  This 
reasonable return is necessary so that the utility can continue 
providing its essential service and so that it can invest in needed 
infrastructure.170  Thus, the Commission uses its discretion to balance 
investor interest in maintaining financial integrity and access to 
                                                          
 164. Id. at 704 (emphasis in original) (explaining that “[i]f a third party wholesale 
buyer can show a rate harms the public interest (perhaps because it is too high to be 
just and reasonable under normal review), but cannot show it seriously harms the 
public, FERC may do nothing about it”). 
 165. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (construing 
the purpose of the analogous Natural Gas Act); see also Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 418 (1952) (stating that one of the major purposes of 
the FPA is to protect consumers against excessive prices).  Keeping rates as low as 
reasonably possible does not, however, mean that, in the world of market-based rates, 
all higher-than-usual rates will be unlawful.  See generally BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 
155–57 (discussing how the Commission monitors the reasonableness of market-
based rates).   
 166. See Atl. Ref. Co., 360 U.S. at 388 (describing the Congressional intent of the 
analogous NGA).   
 167. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974).  
 168. See Duane, supra note 17, at 476–77 (introducing the concept of “utility 
consensus” and discussing how it shaped American regulation of energy).  
 169. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) 
(explaining that a regulated business’s return should be commensurate with returns 
on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks and should allow the 
business to retain its credit and attract capital, but may not produce net revenue). 
 170. See id. (noting the importance of the utility’s ability to make enough revenue 
not just to cover operating expenses but also to cover the capital costs of the business 
such as servicing its debt and paying dividends on stock). 
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capital markets with the consumer interest in not paying exploitative 
rates.171 
But while the Commission considers the interests of investors when 
evaluating the reasonableness of rates, it must do so for the ultimate 
purpose of benefitting the public interest.172  The Commission 
considers the investors’ interests to ensure that the public will 
continue to have access to an affordable and reliable power supply.173  
Consequently, when the Commission seeks to determine whether a 
particular rate is just and reasonable—regardless of whether that rate 
was set by contract or by tariff—the statute requires the Commission 
to base its determination primarily on how the rate affects the public 
interest, not on how it affects the profits of a utility company.174  The 
deregulatory efforts of the last few decades have not changed this 
statutory obligation.175 
Despite acknowledging that high-rate challenges and low-rate 
challenges may often affect the public interest differently,176 Morgan 
Stanley appears to nevertheless largely dispose of this distinction.177  In 
                                                          
 171. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 
679, 690 (1923) (holding that rates that do not yield a sufficient return for a public 
utility to continue its service deprive the public utility of its property in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Atl. Ref. Co., 360 U.S. at 388 (holding that 
Congress intended in the NGA to provide natural gas to consumers at the lowest 
possible reasonable rate and that Congress framed the Act so as to provide 
consumers a complete, permanent, and effective bond of protection from excessive 
rates and charges).  Although the Court addressed the NGA in this case and not the 
FPA, the relevant provisions of these two statutes are substantially identical.  See Ark. 
La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7 (1981) (characterizing the Supreme 
Court’s decisions as establishing a practice of citing decisions interpreting the 
pertinent sections of the two statutes interchangeably). 
 172. Cf. Bluefield Waterworks, 262 U.S. at 693 (holding that a public utility’s return 
should be sufficient to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its 
public duties). 
 173. Id.; see also In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968) 
(“Regulation may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return 
recovered on investment, for investors’ interests provide only one of the variables in 
the constitutional calculus of reasonableness.”); Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603 
(citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942)) 
(noting that the statute requires balancing of consumer and investor interests but 
that, while the regulation should allow for a return to reflect risk, it does not 
guarantee net revenues for the utility). 
 174. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) 
(holding that the Commission’s authority to change rates is based on its duty to 
protect the public interest as distinguished from the interests of utilities).  
 175. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006) (maintaining the same “public interest” 
declaration of policy under the statute as when originally passed into law). 
 176. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
548 (2008) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that the factors applied in Sierra are not 
precisely applicable to the high-rate context). 
 177. See id. at 548–51 (2008) (holding that the Commission’s standard of review 
for all contracts rates must be generally the same and that Commission modification 
of such rates is only permitted in extraordinary circumstances).   
WHITE.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  8:08 PM 
2012] THE FEDERAL POWER ACT’S DOUBLE STANDARD 701 
other words, regardless of whether a contract would ostensibly harm 
the public or harm the private entity that freely negotiated the 
agreement, the Commission must, according to Morgan Stanley, 
presume that all such rates are just and reasonable and cannot make 
any modifications barring extraordinary circumstances.178  This result 
runs contrary to Congressional intent to ensure that the 
Commission’s review fully considers the public interest and that 
consumers pay no more than the lowest reasonable rate for power.179 
Contrary to assertions by the majority,180 the fact that Congress 
chose to include contracts in the statutory scheme does not suggest 
that Congress intended to shield such agreements from the same 
regulatory review given to other rates.181  The majority correctly points 
out that the FPA differs from other similar regulatory statutes that 
relied on purely tariff-based regulatory schemes; this distinction 
indicates that Congress intended for contracts to play a role in 
wholesale power regulation.182  But anticipating a role for contracts 
does not equate to developing a separate regulatory scheme for 
contract rates.183  To the contrary, the fact that section 205 specifically 
requires utilities to file all contracts affecting or relating to rates with 
the Commission,184 and the fact that section 206 contemplates that 
the Commission may change any rate it finds unlawful,185 suggest that 
Congress intended for all such rates to remain fully subject to the 
Commission’s traditional just and reasonable review.186 
                                                          
 178. Id.; see also id. at 530 (opening the opinion by stating that the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine requires the Commission to presume that rates set in freely negotiated 
contracts meet the just and reasonable standard).  
 179. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (describing 
the Congressional intent of the NGA as ensuring the “lowest possible reasonable rate 
consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in the public interest.”); Pa. 
Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 418 (1952) (stating that 
one of the major purposes of the FPA is to protect consumers against excessive 
prices). 
 180. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 531–34 (suggesting that, by deviating from the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which called for a purely tariff-based regulatory scheme, 
Congress intended for the FPA to limit the Commission’s authority to abrogate 
contracts to extraordinary circumstances). 
 181. See id. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s inclusion of 
contracts in section 206 of the act implies that Congress concluded that ordinary 
contract defenses were insufficient to protect the public interest).  
 182. See id. at 531 (comparing the FPA to the Interstate Commerce Act).  
 183. See id. at 559 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the FPA tolerates 
contracts does not make it subservient to contracts.”). 
 184. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (2006). 
 185. Id. § 824e(a). 
 186. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344 
(1956) (suggesting that Congress would not have included contracts in the 
regulatory scheme but for the ability of the Commission to modify them when 
necessary). 
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Furthermore, by imposing its own interpretation of the ambiguous 
statute on the Commission, the Morgan Stanley Court overreached.187  
The FPA does not bind the Commission to any rigid formula for 
determining just and reasonable rates, and courts lack the authority 
to set aside any rate within a “zone of reasonableness.”188  By design, 
Congress sought to establish broad objectives and parameters for the 
regulation of wholesale power while leaving to the administrative 
agency, which possesses expertise on the topic, the discretion to carry 
out those objectives.189  This method of delegating authority to 
agencies with specialized expertise is commonplace in our country’s 
administrative state.190  In addition to contradicting the statutory 
scheme’s plain language and the Congressional intent behind it, the 
Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley misinterpreted the holdings of 
Mobile and Sierra. 
III. MORGAN STANLEY MISINTERPRETED THE NARROW HOLDINGS OF 
MOBILE AND SIERRA AND CREATED SIGNIFICANT HURDLES TO 
CONTRACT REFORMATION 
Mobile and Sierra, taken together, stand for two relatively simple 
propositions:  (1) utilities cannot unilaterally modify a contract rate 
simply by filing a tariff rate;191 and (2) the Commission cannot find a 
contract rate unreasonable, and therefore set it aside, solely because 
the rate becomes unprofitable to the utility.192  Nothing in these 
                                                          
 187. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984) (holding that a gap in a statute signifies that Congress has made an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (“The power of an 
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program 
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap 
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”); see also In re Permian Basin Area Rate 
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968) (observing that the breadth of an agency’s authority 
is determined in part by the purposes for which the agency was created, and thus the 
Court has held that the Commission’s broad responsibilities demand a generous 
construction of its statutory authority).  
 188. See Fed Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585–86 
(1942) (describing the upper and lower bounds of the zone in which the 
Commission can fix rates). 
 189. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
557–58 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress . . . used the general words ‘just 
and reasonable’ because it wanted to give [the Commission], not the courts, wide 
latitude in setting policy.”). 
 190. See generally ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 1–2 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that, while the authority to regulate 
originates in Congress, agencies are the ones that actually govern).  
 191. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 337; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 
U.S. 348, 352–53 (1956). 
 192. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344; see Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353–55 (holding that the 
Commission erred when it found a contract rate unlawful solely because the rate 
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decisions creates an across-the-board presumption of reasonableness 
for contract rates.193  The Supreme Court has misinterpreted these 
largely pro-consumer194 decisions as instead protecting the sanctity of 
private contracts and as a limiting force on the government’s role in 
ensuring just and reasonable rates.195  By further limiting the 
circumstances in which the Commission can modify contracts, the 
Court has imposed hurdles to contract modification and protection 
of consumers.196 
Because the Court in Mobile and Sierra discussed the Commission’s 
review of contract rates and not tariff rates, the fact that courts have 
read into these decisions the creation of a separate statutory scheme 
for reviewing contract rates is perhaps unsurprising.197  But the Court 
in Mobile and Sierra created no such separate scheme, even with 
respect to “low” contract rates as compared to tariff rates, and the 
Court specifically recognized the Commission’s primary responsibility 
regarding protection of the public interest as opposed to the utilities’ 
private interests.198  The standard of review for all rates, contract or 
tariff, is the same:  the Commission must ensure that rates are just 
and reasonable, as determined by its obligation to protect the public 
                                                          
produced a rate of return substantially less than average for the company).  
 193. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (suggesting that, when the interests of a party to 
a contract coincide with the interests of the public, that party can successfully 
petition the Commission to modify the contract); see also Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 
55 F.3d 686, 691 (1st Cir. 1995) (arguing that the extent to which the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption applies depends on the circumstances and on “whose ox is gored”). 
 194. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 562 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that these cases should be read as underscoring the difficulty utilities have in showing 
that a low rate adversely affects the public interest); Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Sellers of 
Long Term Contracts, 103 FERC ¶ 61,345, at 62,446 (2003) (Massey, Comm’r, 
dissenting) (stating that the Mobile-Sierra presumption generally arose when sellers 
attempted to raise rates and that the higher burden to modification thus had a 
consumer protection rationale).  But see Gentile, supra note 109, at 362 (suggesting 
that protecting contracts was also a key concern).  
 195. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 (“We think that the FPA intended to 
reserve the Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those extraordinary 
circumstances where the public will be severely harmed.”). 
 196. See id. at 548 (eliminating the distinction between a buyer’s challenge and a 
seller’s challenge); id. at 545–46 (arguing that Sierra provided a definition of what 
“just and reasonable” means in the contract context regardless of when the contract 
is reviewed). 
 197. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 347 (concluding that the NGA gives no power to 
companies to unilaterally modify their contract rates); Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (“But, 
while it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a 
rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public 
utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or 
that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain.”). 
 198. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 354–55 (noting that its holding did not preclude natural 
gas companies from an avenue of relief when their interests coincided with the 
public interest). 
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interest.199  The Mobile Court recognized that contracts and tariffs 
possess some inherent differences in how they are set and how they 
can be changed, but the Commission’s review of such rates remains 
the same nonetheless.200 
A. Mobile and Sierra Distinguished Between How Utilities Modify 
Contract and Tariff Rates, Not How the Commission Reviews Such Rates 
Contracts play an important role in setting rates for wholesale 
power,201 as the Court in Morgan Stanley recognized.202  But the 
references in Mobile and Sierra to preserving the integrity of contracts 
referred to limiting the utility’s ability to unilaterally modify its 
contracts under section 205, not to limiting the Commission’s 
modification authority.203  The Court in Mobile and Sierra did not seek 
to create a dual-track statutory scheme for the Commission’s review 
of rates depending on whether the company set the rate by contract 
or tariff.204  The Morgan Stanley Court missed this subtle, but 
important, distinction.205  Indeed, courts have arguably misread the 
holdings in Mobile and Sierra for quite some time.206 
The Mobile Court simply held that when Congress chose to include 
contracts in the statutory scheme, Congress contemplated the use of 
contracts in the traditional sense.207  A fundamental principle of 
                                                          
 199. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006) (declaring that regulation is necessary in the 
“public interest”); id. § 824d(a) (explaining the just and reasonable standard).    
 200. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (explaining that setting rates by tariff allows the 
company to propose unilaterally to modify the rates it offers to customers, while 
contracts require mutual agreement for modification). 
 201. See id. at 344 (explaining that the industrial use of natural gas frequently 
requires substantial investments that the consumer would be unwilling to make 
without long-term commitments from the distributor, who in turn needs to make 
long-term arrangements with natural gas companies). 
 202. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
551 (2008) (reasoning that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s standard would give short shrift to 
the important role of contracts in the FPA”).   
 203. See, e.g., Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344 (“Our conclusion that the Natural Gas Act 
does not empower natural gas companies unilaterally to change their contracts fully 
promotes the purposes of the Act.”). 
 204. See, e.g., id. (recognizing that denying natural gas companies the ability to 
unilaterally change rates does not change the Commission’s powers to modify them 
when the public interest requires it). 
 205. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 n.6 (arguing that, regardless of the 
dissent’s reading of the statute, Sierra plainly distinguished between contract and 
tariff rates with respect to the Commission’s review). 
 206. See id. (characterizing lower courts’ reading of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine that 
there is a different review process for contract rates as settled for more than fifty 
years). 
 207. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (noting that the rate-making power of natural gas 
companies is no different from those they would possess in the absence of the 
statute, except where the Act explicitly says otherwise); see also Gentile, supra note 
109, at 353 (characterizing the Mobile decision as holding that the NGA did not 
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contracts is that one party cannot alter the terms at any time unless 
the parties mutually agree to allow such modification.208  Therefore, 
while the statute permits a utility to freely and unilaterally change its 
filed tariff provided the modification is just and reasonable, the Court 
held that Congress did not intend to allow utilities to have similar 
freedom to change their contracts.209  In hindsight, this holding is not 
very controversial.210 
In practice, this holding means that utilities will have to take a 
different procedural avenue to modify a Mobile-Sierra contract as 
compared to a tariff.211  In the electric context, a utility can file a rate 
change for its tariff under section 205 and, when doing so, need only 
show that the new tariff is just and reasonable; it does not need to 
show that the existing tariff was unjust and unreasonable.212  On the 
other hand, by virtue of holding that utilities cannot modify a 
contract unilaterally under section 205, the utility must instead 
present evidence or information to the Commission so that the 
Commission may institute a rate investigation on its own motion 
under section 206 to determine whether the existing contract rate is 
unjust and unreasonable.213  When doing so, the movant would bear 
the burden of making that showing.214  The Court’s holding therefore 
explained the utility’s means for changing contract rates, but not the 
Commission’s standard of review.215  
                                                          
repeal the law of contracts). 
 208. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 507 (2004) (“A valid modification of a contract 
must satisfy all the criteria essential for a valid original contract, including offer, 
acceptance, and consideration.  Hence, one party to a contract may not unilaterally 
alter its terms.”). 
 209. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (discussing how contracts and tariffs differed in the 
absence of the statute).    
 210. See Gentile, supra note 109, at 356 (observing that this first holding merely 
recognizes that a utility can circumscribe its own ability to file tariff rate increases by 
entering into contracts). 
 211. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (explaining that lacking the ability to 
unilaterally change a contracted rate does not preclude the natural gas company 
from petitioning the Commission to find the rate unjust and unreasonable). 
 212. Proposed rates and terms under section 205 go into effect automatically after 
the requisite period of notice given to the public unless the Commission, upon 
protests from third parties or on its own motion, institutes a hearing to determine 
the rate’s lawfulness.  Upon such a hearing, the utility filing the tariff bears the 
burden of demonstrating the new rate’s reasonableness.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717c 
(detailing the procedure for rates to go into effect in the NGA); 16 U.S.C. § 824d 
(detailing the procedure for the FPA).  
 213. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e (setting forth the procedures for changing an existing 
rate); see also Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(describing the interplay between sections 205 and 206 and the required showings 
under each section).  
 214. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(b) (stating that the movant bears the burden of proof to 
show that the rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential). 
 215. See Gentile, supra note 109, at 356 (interpreting Mobile as merely recognizing 
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The Sierra Court went on to discuss the Commission’s authority 
under section 206 to allow a utility to modify a contract.216  The Court 
held that the Commission cannot set a contract rate aside as unjust 
and unreasonable solely to relieve a utility of its “improvident 
bargain.”217  This holding singled out contracts not because the Court 
intended to create a new standard of review for contract rates 
generally, but because, by virtue of its earlier holding, only contracts 
require a finding of unlawfulness before they can be replaced.218  In 
other words, the Commission will not find itself in the position of 
having to respond to a section 206 petition or complaint from a 
utility arguing that its filed tariff is too low because the utility can 
increase it under section 205.219 
In sum, the Court in Mobile and Sierra attempted to grapple with a 
statute that seemed to contradict itself:  it incorporates contracts into 
the statutory scheme, while also appearing to allow utilities a statutory 
mechanism to unilaterally modify those contracts.220  The Court 
resolved this conflict by holding that Congress did not intend to 
provide a statutory mechanism by which utilities could change their 
contracts simply because such a change would be in their private 
interest.221  Therefore, the procedure the utility undertakes to change 
its contract and tariff rates has to account for the inherently different 
ways these types of rates are set.222   
                                                          
that a natural gas company can circumscribe its own right to file rate increases by 
entering into contracts).  
 216. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 354–55 (1956) 
(deciding that the Commission erred when it found an existing contract rate unjust 
and unreasonable based solely on how the contract rate affected the utility). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (codifying the utility’s ability to file new rate schedules).  
By removing the utility’s ability to replace or modify a contract unilaterally under 
section 205, the only available avenue for modifying a contract is by petitioning the 
Commission under section 206.  See id. § 824e (codifying the Commission’s authority 
to modify existing rates). 
 219. See id. § 824d(e) (stating that when a utility files a new rate, the utility bears 
the burden during the hearing of demonstrating the lawfulness of the new rate); id. 
§ 824e (stating that, in any hearing to determine the lawfulness of an existing rate, 
the complaining party or the Commission bears the burden of demonstrating the 
existing rate’s unlawfulness).     
 220. See, e.g., id. § 824d (allowing utilities to supplement their rate schedules with 
contracts and contemplating unilateral replacement of rate schedules without 
distinguishing tariffs from contracts).  
 221. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344 
(1956) (determining that the NGA preserves the integrity of contracts by barring 
natural gas companies from unilaterally modifying contracts rates). 
 222. See id. at 343–44 (acknowledging that the NGA contemplates natural gas 
companies changing their rates from time to time but interpreting the statute as 
declining to define these powers and implying that contracts in particular cannot be 
changed unilaterally).   
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B. Mobile and Sierra Distinguished Between the Public Interest and the 
Private Interests of Utilities, Not Between Contracts and Tariffs 
Perhaps the biggest error by the Morgan Stanley Court and others 
before it is the assumption that the Mobile and Sierra decisions’ 
references to the “public interest”223 sought to impose a different 
standard of review on the Commission for contract rates—a standard 
of review more demanding than the statute’s just and reasonable 
standard.224  To the contrary, these references to the public interest 
merely reflected the Commission’s already-existing statutory 
mandate.225  The Court attempted to underscore how the 
Commission’s duty to protect the public interest requires it to 
consider changes to contracts differently depending on whom the 
allegedly unreasonable contract harms—not depending on whether 
the rate was filed as a contract or a tariff.226   
Rather than limiting the Commission’s contract modification 
powers, the Mobile Court in fact suggested that the statute would not 
allow natural gas companies or utilities to set rates by contract in the 
first place absent the Commission’s ability to review and ostensibly 
modify such rates to protect the public interest.227  The Court also 
recognized that those who represent the public interest have a higher 
standing to seek modification of their contracts than do those who 
seek changes solely to protect private interests.228  Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
 223. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 
(1956) (“In such circumstances the sole concern of the Commission would seem to 
be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest . . . .”). 
 224. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
534 (2008) (holding that, under the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a 
contract rate requires “unequivocal public necessity”); see also Texaco Inc. v. FERC, 
148 F.3d 1091, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (arguing that the public interest standard 
required to modify contracts under Mobile-Sierra is something different from, and 
more exacting than, the statute’s reference to the public interest). 
 225. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2006) (“[T]he business of transporting and selling 
natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest 
and that Federal regulation in matters relating to the transportation of natural gas 
and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the public 
interest.”); 16 U.S.C. § 824a (“[T]he business of transmitting and selling electric 
energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and . . 
. Federal regulation . . . is necessary in the public interest . . . .”). 
 226. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (noting that natural gas companies are 
“understandably” not given the same standing to complain of their own contracts as 
those who represent the public interest, but that they could petition the Commission 
to make modifications if their interests align with the public interest); Sierra, 350 U.S. 
at 355 (holding that the statute requires the Commission to protect the public 
interest as distinguished from the private interests of utilities).  
 227. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339 (“[T]he Natural Gas Act permits the relations 
between the parties to be established initially by contract, the protection of the 
public interest being afforded by supervision of the individual contracts, which to 
that end must be filed with the Commission and made public.”). 
 228. See 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (excluding natural gas companies from the list of 
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Commission can still potentially relieve natural gas companies or 
utilities of their contract rates:  companies have the statutory right to 
petition the Commission to make a finding that an existing contract 
rate is unjust and unreasonable.229  As the Court in Mobile cautioned, 
though, an entity will only have success when its interests coincide 
with the public interest.230  In other words, a natural gas company or 
electric utility will only be able to modify a contract rate if the 
Commission determines that the rate harms the public interest, not if 
it only harms the company.231   
The Sierra Court attempted to elaborate on this idea of how rarely a 
seller will be able to successfully argue that a low rate harms the 
public interest.232  In Morgan Stanley, however, the Court erroneously 
interpreted Sierra as stating that contracts can rarely be modified in 
general.233  As the Sierra Court explained, when a utility asks the 
Commission to increase a low contract rate simply because the rate 
proves unprofitable for the utility, the Commission’s objective should 
be to protect the public interest.234  But, because the public interest is 
rarely harmed by a low rate, in such circumstances the low rate would 
only harm the public interest in extraordinary circumstances, that is, 
if the rate “might impair the financial ability of the public utility to 
continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, 
or be unduly discriminatory.”235  Put more simply, only if the contract 
                                                          
those who can file a complaint but still allowing companies to petition the 
Commission to conduct a hearing on its own motion); Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 
(“[N]atural gas companies are understandably not given the same explicit standing 
to complain of their own contracts as are those who represent the public interest . . . 
.”). 
 229. See 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (“Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had 
upon its own motion or upon complaint . . . shall find that any rate, charge, or 
classification . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the 
Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, 
regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force . . . .”); Mobile, 
350 U.S. at 344–45 (describing how its holding that tariffs could not supersede 
contracts did not completely preclude any opportunity for the natural gas company 
to get relief from an unfavorable contract).  
 230. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (explaining that the avenue of relief would only 
exist when the company’s interests aligned with the public interest).  
 231. Id.  
 232. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) 
(explaining that a low rate could harm the public interest if it forces the utility out of 
business, casts upon other consumers an excessive burden, or is unduly 
discriminatory).  
 233. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
551–52 n.6 (2008) (arguing that Sierra plainly distinguished between contract and 
tariff rates with respect to the Commission’s review).  
 234. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 354–55 (“In such circumstances the sole concern of the 
Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the 
public interest . . . .”).  
 235. See id. at 355 (defining the public interest in the low-rate context). 
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rate will literally force the utility out of business—thus depriving the 
public of power—or cause some other serious harm or discrimination 
to third parties, will a low rate harm the public interest.236   
Therefore, when read together, the Mobile and Sierra decisions 
make no attempt to limit the Commission’s ability to set aside 
contract rates as a general matter, as the Court contends in Morgan 
Stanley.237  Mobile and Sierra instead:  (1) eliminated a utility’s ability to 
modify a contract rate unilaterally under section 205 of the FPA 
unless the contract permits it to do so; and (2) instructed the 
Commission to consider the public interest, not the private interests 
of utilities, when evaluating changes to such contract rates under 
section 206.238  The Commission must consider the public interest in 
all cases; the Court simply sought to clarify how the public interest is 
affected differently depending on whether a rate is allegedly too low 
or too high.239 
C. Morgan Stanley Expands the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine and Creates 
Additional Hurdles to Contract Modification 
Courts and commentators have often used the phrase “practically 
insurmountable” to describe the barrier the Mobile-Sierra doctrine has 
placed on the Commission’s ability to reform freely-negotiated 
contract rates.240  This phrase first appeared in an opinion written by 
then D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia, who also authored the 
majority’s opinion in Morgan Stanley.241  The Commission and some 
courts have since acknowledged the error of this characterization,242 
                                                          
 236. Id.   
 237. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530 (holding that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
requires the Commission to presume that any freely-negotiated contract meets the 
just and reasonable standard). 
 238. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing how Mobile and Sierra sought to 
distinguish the public interest from the merely private interests of a utility). 
 239. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (limiting its description of how the public interest is 
affected to “such circumstances,” i.e., circumstances in which a seller attempts to 
raise a low contract rate). 
 240. E.g., Kan. Cities v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 87–88 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is “virtually inoperative”); Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. 
FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that the “Commission itself is 
unaware of any case” in which a court granted relief under the Mobile-Sierra 
standard); Gentile, supra note 109, at 353 (explaining the struggle for private 
litigants that has ensued in the years since the implementation of the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine).     
 241. See Papago, 723 F.2d at 954 (“The public-interest standard is practically 
insurmountable; the Commission itself is unaware of any case granting relief under 
it.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 691 (1st Cir. 1995) 
[hereinafter Ne. Utils. II] (characterizing the notion of a “practically 
insurmountable” barrier as a “gloss” of the case law and holding instead that the 
strength of the barrier the Commission must overcome depends on the 
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and the Commission has in fact overcome the public interest 
standard to modify some contracts.243  Nevertheless, Morgan Stanley 
creates further barriers to contract modification because it appears to 
preclude the Commission from making distinctions between high- 
and low-rate challenges and from considering the timing of when the 
Commission reviews the contract.244 
Prior to Morgan Stanley, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine had not 
prohibited contract modification in such broad circumstances.245  For 
example, courts expressed a greater willingness to allow the 
Commission to modify contracts that the Commission was reviewing 
for the first time as opposed to contracts already approved by the 
Commission.246  Mobile and Sierra, after all, involved circumstances in 
which sellers attempted to modify contracts that the Commission had 
already accepted under its traditional just and reasonable review.247  
Courts also appeared to recognize that Mobile and Sierra involved 
challenges to “low” contract rates and that, at the very least, a less 
stringent application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should apply in 
circumstances outside of the low-rate context.248  
                                                          
circumstances); Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,332, at 62,087 (1994) (stating that 
employing a “practically insurmountable” barrier to contract modification on the 
Commission’s initial review of contracts would transform public regulation into little 
more than rubber-stamping private contracts).  
 243. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 693 (affirming Commission modifications to a 
wholesale power contract between three entities).  
 244. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548 (holding that the standard for a buyer’s 
challenge must be generally the same as the standard for a seller’s challenge); id. at 
546 (characterizing Sierra as setting parameters for the “just and reasonable” 
standard for contract rates generally).  
 245. See Tewksbury, supra note 73, at 445–46 n.81 (synthesizing a pattern for cases 
in which the courts have permitted modifications to Mobile-Sierra contracts).  
 246. Some courts (and the Commission) have held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
does not apply at all to the Commission’s initial review of a contract, while others 
have opted to impose a less demanding version of the Mobile-Sierra standard upon 
initial review of a contract.  Compare Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 
283 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that the Mobile-Sierra presumption only applies after the 
contract is accepted for filing), and Fla. Power & Light Co., 67 FERC ¶ 61,141, at 
61,397 (1994) (arguing that effective rate regulation would end if the Commission 
had to employ the Mobile-Sierra standard of review even upon its initial review of a 
contract) with Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 692 (accepting the Commission’s explanation 
that a more “flexible” public interest standard was permissible because the 
Commission was presented with the contract for the first time).   
 247. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC at 62,076 (characterizing the “classic” Mobile-
Sierra situation as when a seller attempts to unilaterally increase a contract rate 
already on file with the Commission).  
 248. See Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 690 (holding that the public interest standard 
evolved in the context of a low rate challenge and cannot be interpreted as applying 
in all other contexts); see also Ariz. Corp. Comm’n v. FERC, 397 F.3d 952, 953–54 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (approving the Commission’s modification to existing settlement 
contracts).  But see Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 403, 407 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (extending the stringent Mobile-Sierra protection of contracts to high-rate 
challenges).  
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For example, in Northeast Utilities Service Co. v. FERC,249 a case that 
did not involve a “low-rate” challenge,250 the Commission reviewed a 
newly-filed contract and ordered one of the parties to make several 
changes to bring the contract within the bounds of the just and 
reasonable standard.251  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit remanded the case to the Commission, advising that the 
Commission had applied the wrong standard and needed to instead 
apply the stricter Mobile-Sierra “public interest” standard.252  On 
remand, the Commission had little trouble providing analysis to 
demonstrate that the very same contract modifications were necessary 
in the public interest.253  The First Circuit upheld these 
modifications,254 recognizing how the different circumstances of 
Mobile and Sierra allowed for a more flexible application of the 
“public interest” standard and rejecting the notion of any sort of 
insurmountable barrier to contract modification in all 
circumstances.255 
The Morgan Stanley opinion, however, appears to significantly 
curtail the Commission’s ability to adapt its review to circumstances 
that differ from those in Mobile and Sierra.256  A contract is a contract, 
the Court reasons, and thus the Commission must make no 
distinction based on which entity is seeking to change the contract, 
and it must make no distinction based on whether the Commission 
had an initial opportunity to review the contract.257  At a minimum, 
the Morgan Stanley decision has cast doubt on the Commission’s 
                                                          
 249. Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d 686 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 250. See id. at 690 (noting that the issues in this case involved changing the return 
on equity formula and the cost of decommissioning a power plant, neither of which 
involved “low rate” challenges in the context of Mobile and Sierra). 
 251. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 50 FERC ¶ 61,266, at 61,837 (1990) (setting the filed 
contract for hearing on the basis that some provisions may not be just and 
reasonable). 
 252. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 961 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter 
Ne. Utils. I] (holding that, by modifying a contract under the public interest 
standard by finding that the contract was unjust and unreasonable, the Commission 
conflated the just and reasonable standard with the public interest standard).    
 253. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,322, at 62,088 (1994) (concluding that its 
original modifications were necessary to protect the interests of nonparties to the 
contract).  
 254. See Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 693 (affirming the Commission’s finding under the 
reasoning that the Commission had given thoughtful consideration to the public 
interest in reviewing the contract it had previously modified under the traditional 
just and reasonable standard). 
 255. See id. at 691 (characterizing the notion of a “practically insurmountable” 
barrier in all circumstances as a “gloss” of the Court’s holdings in Mobile and Sierra). 
 256. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court forbade 
the Commission from distinguishing claims based on whether they argued the rate 
was too high or too low).  
 257. Id.  
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ability to modify a contract rate that harms the public unless that 
harm rises to “extraordinary circumstances.”258  While the doctrine 
has not been “practically insurmountable” in the past, instances of 
the Commission overcoming the barrier and successfully modifying 
contracts has generally come either outside the low-rate context or 
upon the Commission’s initial review of the contract, or both.259  If 
the majority opinion eliminates any notion of a more “flexible” 
standard in those circumstances, envisioning when contract 
modification will stand becomes more difficult.260 
To remain consistent both with the statute and the cases from 
which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine derived its name, the Commission 
must have the ability to modify any rate, whether by contract or tariff, 
when necessary to protect the public interest.261  And when seeking to 
protect the public interest, the Commission needs to distinguish the 
interests of the consuming public from that of utility companies.262  
The Commission should not need to show, however, that 
“unequivocal public necessity” requires a modification to a contract; 
this heightened requirement represents a misreading of Mobile and 
Sierra and contradicts the statute.263  Rather, the Commission should 
simply need to show, as with any rate, that the rate is unjust and 
unreasonable when evaluated in light of the public interest 
perspective.264  Either the buyer or the seller’s interests could 
                                                          
 258. See McCaffrey, supra note 108, at 70, 75 (arguing that the combination of 
these two holdings in Morgan Stanley calls into question whether the Commission 
could even modify contracts that explicitly contradict Commission regulations or 
policies absent a showing of serious harm to the public interest). 
 259. See Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 692–93 (accepting Commission modification of a 
newly-filed, non-low rate contract); id. at 691–92 (explaining that how “flexible” the 
standard should be depends on “whose ox is gored”).  
 260. Id. at 692; see supra note 258 (suggesting that the threshold placed on the 
Commission for contract modification is already quite stringent because it requires 
extreme harm to the public interest).  Moreover, the Court recently further 
expanded the reach of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine by holding that third-party 
challengers, not just parties to the contract itself, must also overcome the strict 
presumption of reasonableness of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.  NRG Power Mktg., 
L.L.C. v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 701 (2010).   
 261. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006) (providing no distinction between contract and 
tariff rates when defining the Commission’s duty to ensure that “all” rates are just 
and reasonable); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 
344 (1956) (“[C]ontracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the 
Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest.”).   
 262. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) 
(“That the purpose of the power given the Commission by § 206(a) is the protection 
of the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests of the utilities, is 
evidenced by the recital in § 201 of the Act that the scheme of regulation imposed ‘is 
necessary in the public interest.’”). 
 263. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (defining no differing application of the just and 
reasonable standard for contract rates). 
 264. Id. 
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potentially coincide with the public interest.265   
Even under the traditional just and reasonable review, the party 
seeking to alter a rate under section 206 carries the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the rate violates the just and reasonable 
standard.266  This heavy burden should apply to parties seeking to 
modify contract rates as well, but the burden should not be so heavy 
as to effectively preclude the Commission from performing its 
statutory duty to keep rates just and reasonable in the public 
interest.267   
CONCLUSION 
Electricity is a rather unique consumer good.  We tend not to 
appreciate its benefits—indeed, we tend to hardly notice it at all—
until we are suddenly deprived of its use.  Our dependence on 
electricity makes rolling blackouts and prohibitively expensive rates 
dangerous and unacceptable.  Thus, while this country has seen the 
development of competitive markets for electricity, these markets 
differ from markets for other, less essential goods.  Even as 
policymakers embrace market-based deregulatory reforms, regulatory 
authorities still possess a great responsibility to keep the lights on—
and to ultimately protect the interests of consumers. 
The western energy crisis of 2001 called into question the ability of 
state and federal officials to carry out these duties.  Against the 
backdrop of rolling blackouts, wholesale buyers of power faced 
unprecedented market conditions and had little choice but to enter 
into long-term contracts at exorbitantly high rates.  Consumers, 
therefore, were saddled with these high rates long after the markets 
calmed and returned closer to historical levels.  This market 
uncertainty highlights the fragility of deregulated electricity markets 
and underscores the importance of maintaining regulatory checks on 
this increasingly deregulated industry.   
The majority in Morgan Stanley missed an opportunity to bring the 
                                                          
 265. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (explaining that, while unlikely, the seller could 
still potentially modify a contract rate if it can demonstrate to the Commission that 
its interests align with the public interest); Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (giving a specific, 
although not exclusive, list of the types of circumstances in which the seller’s 
interests would coincide with the public interest, including where the low rate would 
force the utility out of business). 
 266. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(b) (stating that the burden of proof for any proposed 
modification falls on the complaining party or the Commission if the Commission 
initiates the proceeding).   
 267. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 
568–69 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s holding as 
limiting the Commission’s discretion to protect the public interest).  
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Mobile-Sierra doctrine back in line with the statutory scheme and the 
cases from which the doctrine took its name.  The Mobile and Sierra 
cases have been interpreted as shielding Mobile-Sierra contracts from 
thorough Commission review for quite some time; certainly Morgan 
Stanley was not the first case to hold as much.  But Morgan Stanley went 
beyond the cases before it.  This decision further erodes the 
Commission’s ability to protect the public interest by limiting the 
Commission’s ability to modify excessively high rates or rates that are 
otherwise harmful to third parties.  The Mobile-Sierra doctrine will 
likely continue to evolve, however, as the Commission and courts 
struggle to understand and apply what the D.C. Circuit, perhaps 
ironically, once referred to as a “refreshingly simple”268 rule. 
 
                                                          
 268. Richmond Power & Light v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 481 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
